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Abstract
PSM are not going through their finest moment. Adequate funding to ensure their survival 
is one of the fundamental factors that will shape their future. This paper takes a look at 
and compares the history of British and Spanish PSM, two very different systems. In both 
cases, they have suffered from cutbacks, though on a very different scale. In general, the 
mechanisms for obtaining necessary budgets are still bound to their respective traditions.
Resumen
Los medios audiovisuales públicos no están en su mejor momento. Una adecuada 
financiación que permita su supervivencia es uno de los factores fundamentales que 
marcarán el futuro. Este artículo recorre la historia de los sistemas mediáticos británico 
y español y los compara. En ambos casos, han sufrido recortes, aunque en escala muy 
distinta. Los mecanismos para obtener el presupuesto necesario están aún ligados a las 
tradiciones respectivas.
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]1. The PSM crisis
The future of Public Service Media (PSM) or public service broadcasting 
(PSB) looks pretty bleak. There are many uncertainties, virulent discussions 
about their funding model, continual cuts, etc. The crisis has spread throughout 
Europe, the cradle of these radio and television corporations inherent to the 
Old Continent. They are facing moral and economic bankruptcy apparently 
condemning them to minimisation, privatisation or, at worst, extinction. 
Different experts and organisations have raised the alarm: “The visibility and 
sustainability of national players, and therefore the national audio-visual industry, 
is endangered” (EBU, 2015, p. 7). Furthermore, there is enormous pressure 
to reduce PSM organisations, restrict investment options, and limit online and 
digital operations (Lowe and Steemers, 2012). That said, we should not forget 
that the crisis is not new, the last 25 years having been marked by prophecies 
of doom and gloom (Debrett, 2014). Richeri, for example, has warned that PSM 
are suffering a three-fold crisis of legitimacy, financing and identity (1994). The 
crisis actually goes back to the 1980s with the deregulation and flexibilisation 
of European audio-visual policy as a whole (Gavaldà Roca, 2014), together with a 
generalised undermining of public corporations brought about by the neoliberal 
theories proposed by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan on both sides of 
the Atlantic in favour of financial profitability. During this time, “public entities not 
only faced a slow death due to the rise in competition, economic pressures and 
the ideological, market-oriented change; but also the threat of suicide” (Rowland 
& Tracey, quoted in Ojer Goñi, 2009, p. 21). Since then, things seem to have gone 
from bad to worse: “A potent combination of regulatory, financial, commercial 
and technological challenges encourage an idea that, as an institution, the PSB 
is in serious decline and perhaps past its sell-by date” (Lowe & Steemers, 2012, 
p. 10). The crisis is especially significant in Western Europe, whereas in the 
so-called Global South (Asia, Africa and Latin America), PSBs are growing and 
developing (Rahman & Lowe, 2016). Digitalisation and competition from Internet 
services or social networks via which more and more audio-visual material is 
shared, are also compelling circumstances. As researchers, we must shift the 
focus of traditional media towards a “broader view of content creation and flows 


























& Shaver, 2014, p. 48). To this must be added the persistent crisis in public 
radio and television services which has lasted now for over 30 years.
The panorama has very often been described as so bleak that it is 
surprising that these corporations have survived at all and could even be said 
to be in good health: Ofcom has stressed that the television crisis has been 
exaggerated and in spite of the general perception, the main news programmes 
have maintained their audiences (Cushion, 2012). Even so, as Curran concludes, 
it would seem prudent to treat predictions about the imminent transformation of 
communications with some caution (2005, p. 210). 
The most extreme cases of the PSM crisis have occurred in the 
periphery of the European system. The situation in Spain is paradigmatic in 
this sense: RTVE is immersed in a deep crisis in terms of both its identity 
and finances. Moreover, the complex situation of regional autonomy as regards 
audio-visual policy has not helped much either. The dramatic closure of Canal 
9 Radiotelevisió Valenciana (RTVV) in 2013, a broadcaster with 25 years of 
history, is a good example. The authorities of the Valencia Community region are 
striving to reopen it, but in the meantime it is still the only public broadcasting 
company in Europe that remains closed due to the crisis.
Private competitors have taken advantage of the general crisis 
affecting the audio-visual business model as a whole to doggedly attack public 
media. In the UK, the BBC —at the core of the PSM system— has become the 
main target of the attacks launched by the media magnate Rupert Murdoch, 
for whom “the only reliable, durable, and perpetual guarantor of independence 
is profit” (Debrett, 2014, p. 42). In Spain, the private broadcasters under the 
umbrella of the lobby Unión de Televisiones Comerciales Asociadas (UTECA) 
financed a devastating study that underlined the disproportionate spending, 
scant profitability and bloated debt of their public competitors (Deloitte, 2011), 
and their lobbying finally led to the government supressing advertising on RTVE 
(Azurmendi, 2007). Despite the generalised perception of economic crisis 
—especially in the audio-visual industry— and the eternal complaints from 
private companies, it is worth remembering their official income figures, which 
are substantial in both the British and Spanish cases. As for the Murdoch’s Sky, 
it earned €970.2 million according to its annual balance as of June 2015 (Sky, 
2016). In Spain, the Atresmedia group brought in a respectable €970.2 million, 
also in 2015, compared to €883.2  million the previous year (Atresmedia, 
tribuna
























































]2016). Mediaset España, Atresmedia’s biggest competitor, controlled by Silvio 
Berlusconi’s Fininvest group, whose flagship is the TV station Telecinco, made 
a similar amount in the same year: €971 million, compared to €932 million in 
2014 (PwC, 2016). As can be seen, it does not seem appropriate to talk of a 
crisis when bearing in mind the solid profits which, furthermore, are still rising.
Now is a time of change. On the one hand, the BBC has been 
immersed in the renewal of its Royal Charter, involving a heated debate that 
will ultimately give rise to the model that is to govern the corporation over 
the next decade. On the other, in Spain the national and local elections have 
completely altered the political landscape. The ascent of new political parties 
that have proclaimed new forms of government based on participatory tools 
and open processes that take citizens into account, has modified the rules of 
the game. The PSM model is also pending renovation. And the BBC, of course, 
is a model to follow in any discussion about the future of Spanish public service 
media. The BBC has served as an example for Spain at different times, such 
as when the socialist government of President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero 
implemented the well-intentioned but failed reform of RTVE as of 2006 
(Azurmendi, 2007, p. 271). Speaking on public radio during the last election 
campaign, President Mariano Rajoy called for an agreement between all the 
parties to achieve an unbiased public broadcasting service free of financial 
problems1. However, following the management of the previous government, 
hounded by accusations (Consejo de Informativos TVE, 2014) and justified 
inquiries and studies that underscore the news programmes’ politically biased 
focus (Gavaldà Roca, 2014; Soengas Pérez & Rodríguez Vázquez, 2014), 
perhaps we should not be too optimistic about Rajoy’s supposedly good 
intentions. The BBC has also served as an example for the symbolic case 
of Radiotelevisió Valenciana (RTVV), specifically as regards the creation of 
an Audience Council (Consell de la Ciutadania) under the new Act 6/2016 
on Autonomous Public Service Radio and Television Broadcasting (Corporació 
Valenciana de Mitjans Audiovisuals)2, a body demanded by Podemos, one of the 
new emerging parties, and inspired by the British model. 
1 http://www.eldiario.es/sociedad/Mariano-Rajoy-TVE-independiente-BBC_0_527397376.html [Accessed 
11/06/16].



























Our research falls within this general context of crisis in public radio and 
television corporations outlined above. It focuses specifically on the comparison of 
the financing mechanisms that these corporations have used to date or that they 
propose to use in the immediate future. The means of obtaining funding is clearly 
essential in order to ensure continuity, offer programmes of a suitable quality, and 
enjoy sufficient independence from the government of the day in order to guarantee 
unbiased news programmes—the backbone of any PSM. Subsequently, the way 
in which these funds are administered and a coherent programme schedule and 
public service is articulated will doubtless be important. Nevertheless, the means 
of obtaining budgets, where these come from and how far they go are the main 
pillars on which everything else rests. Therefore, emphasis will be placed on the 
budgetary changes, discussions and proposals that have emerges in the context 
of renovating two systems at the extremes of the European public audio-visual 
ecosystem. Accordingly, we will first take a look at the BBC, the radio and television 
broadcasting corporation that from its advent has been a yardstick for its European 
counterparts and which is currently in turmoil, before focusing on an audio-visual 
system on the periphery of the continent. Spain has become a paradigmatic 
model especially in terms of what should not be done if the aim is to preserve the 
European public television model. From the perspective of a comparative analysis of 
two systems that are poles apart, yet which share goals and a raison d’être, we shall 
concentrate on the financing mechanisms that we regard as central to their future 
viability. By establishing the current state of the question, taking into consideration 
the different historical communication models and the predictions and ideas aimed 
at making conventional broadcasting compatible with new convergent forms of 
communication, we believe that we will be able to draw conclusions that may pave 
the way to a tenable public audio-visual system with a future. 
3. Analysis and discussion
3.1 The British model
The BBC is governed by a complex legal framework whose fundamental 
point of reference is the Royal Charter, which usually runs for 10 years and 
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]establishes general policies, trends and governability, amongst other matters. 
Redrafting the clauses within the new charter is a long, painstaking process 
lasting nearly two years with precise milestones. The Green Paper (Department 
for Culture, Media & Sports [DCMS], 2015), containing general assessments 
and guidelines, was the first of two documents drawn up by the government, 
followed by a number of different reports published throughout 2016. The final 
report, the White Paper (DCMS, 2016), outlines the official proposal and acts as 
the basis for the new Royal Charter.
Prospects at the beginning of the process could not have been more 
dire. For some authors, the future of the BBC was more uncertain than ever 
(Mair, Tait & Keeble 2014). The fact that the renewal was to be carried out 
with the Conservatives in power set all the alarm bells ringing, especially when 
bearing in mind that the then Secretary of State for Culture —on whom the BBC 
depends— John Whittingdale had been arguing for years for its minimisation by 
reducing the licence fee3.
Even so, in spite of all the gloomy forecasts of budget cuts justified by 
the crisis, the data show that the BBC is still the biggest and most influential 
actor in the UK audio-visual market. The corporation has a 33% TV and a 53% 
radio audience share (Oliver, Ohlbam & Oxera, 2016, p. 9). As for the Internet, 
its website is still one of the most important in the world, with 101 million hits 
in 2015 (BBC, 2015, p. 9). However, other studies have found that despite 
the BBC’s strength it has become less popular among young people and racial 
minorities (BBC Trust, 2014). 
The White Paper’s release went a long way to dispel the doubts about 
the corporation’s future prospects. In the autumn of 2016, parliamentary 
debates were scheduled prior to the act completing its passage through 
Parliament. Furthermore, this process was marked by the political instability 
brought about by the victory of the Brexit vote that cost the new charter’s prime 
mover —PM David Cameron— his job. The document laid out the government’s 
intentions. Over the next 10-11 years, the BBC would continue as before: “It 
feels less like a blowout and more like a slow puncture” (Freedman, 2016, 




























disappeared; it has only diminished for the time being. The crux of the matter, 
according to the corporation’s director Tony Hall, was more BBC or less BBC 
(2016); extending or reducing, or at least maintaining. On this matter, the White 
Paper did not beat about the bush: for at least the next five years, increased 
licence fees in line with the CPI are to be maintained. This means that the BBC 
will still earn a similar amount to the €3.7 billion obtained in 2015, out of a total 
budget of €5 billion. The BBC is the best financed public television corporation 
in Europe (DCMS, 2016, p. 92), according to data provided by the European 
Audiovisual Observatory (2016). It should be pointed out, though, that this is 
only the case if the absolute funding figures are taken into account, as opposed 
to funding per inhabitant with respect to which the United Kingdom (UK) at €76 
trails behind Finland (€85) and Germany (€98) (Sehl, Cornia & Nielsen, 2016). 
In any case, the British government has reasons to claim that the BBC is a well-
financed institution. And obviously, a sufficient budget means plenty of in-house 
production and the maintenance of jobs.
There are many other novel aspects that have a bearing on the future 
of the BBC, but we shall concentrate here on those concerning its financing. The 
increased licence fee is still the public broadcasting service’s prime source of 
funding, although some interesting changes have been put forward. One of the 
great disadvantages of this historical tax is clearly the fact that it is applied at a 
flat rate, implying that it does not factor in the enormous differences in income 
of licence holders. At least for the time being, people over 75 years of age are 
exempt from paying it. This is not a minor aspect: the government estimates 
the total cost at €745 million until 2020. It has also been suggested that the 
so-called “iPlayer loophole” be closed, in order that on-demand programming 
should also contribute to defraying production costs (DCMS, 2016, p. 91). The 
changes in reception brought about by convergence will also have an impact on 
income generation channels. Nowadays, consumers are adopting an anywhere, 
anytime, any device (AWATAD) lifestyle (Gimpel, 2015). Furthermore, around 61% 
of adults access the Internet via their mobile phones (triple the number than in 
2009), and over 50% claim that they use the Internet to watch television and 
videos. Two thirds of them did so over the last week (Ofcom, 2015, pp. 85-
86). These figures confirm the relentless growth of on-demand programming, 
whether at home or on the go. With this evolution in audio-visual consumption, 
maintaining a system of financing based solely on charging those who watch 
tribuna
























































]television in the traditional way is, without a doubt, completely illogical. Lastly, 
the Government has recommended that the BBC should explore additional 
sources of commercial financing, specifically mentioning subscription payments.
In addition to obtaining funding, the way in which it should be spent 
is also stipulated. The licence fee does not only serve to finance the BBC’s 
services, which is why the creation of a new public service content fund has 
been proposed with a yearly budget in the region of £20 million. This will be used 
to promote less prominent genres including children’s programmes, religion and 
ethics, education and arts, and classical music. Minority audiences, such as 
immigrants and regional and international communities, will also be catered for. 
(DCMS, 2016, p. 72).
Its critics have been quick off the mark and a number of alternative 
proposals have been put forward. Lord Puttnam’s report on the future of public 
service television recommends a far-reaching licence fee reform based on a 
number of criteria such as income levels to make it more egalitarian. It even 
proposes to generate additional income with a levy on mobile phone operators 
and manufacturers (2016, p. 37). In point of fact, as will be mentioned further 
on, there has been a similar levy in Spain and France for some time now, an 
issue that has not been free of controversy. The licence fee has been defined as 
an “outdated symbol” (2016, p. 60) for, in spite of its reputation as a guarantee 
of independence and impartiality, recent history suggests that it has not freed 
the BBC from interference. It is also a notably regressive tax. Nevertheless, 
Puttnam is not in favour of introducing subscription fees, insofar as he believes 
that this would exclude those who cannot afford to pay such fees for the quality 
content. He recommends a system of household payments, collected via the 
Council Tax, and even considers financing via general taxation. At any rate, the 
decision process for allocating funds should be independent of the government.
Besides the debates about the change of model, we believe that the 
current Conservative government’s surprising commitment to maintaining the 
budget and therefore the size and power of the BBC has been influenced by 
the political circumstances. To our mind, the uncertainties plaguing the Brexit 
referendum and its unexpected result may have had an influence. Cameron’s 
government was aware of the importance of the decision —which has triggered 
an economic earthquake with as yet unforeseen consequences— and perhaps 


























an unpopular decision in the UK and would helped the opposition to undermine 
the government’s public image. Whittingdale was also caught between a rock and 
hard place due to the controversy surrounding his relationship with a prostitute, 
which newspapers like Rupert Murdoch’s The Sun had been accused of keeping 
under wraps4. The fallout caused by the Brexit victory and the subsequent 
formation of Theresa May’s new government ultimately cost the veteran MP his 
job and any chance of seeing through the Royal Charter reform process that he 
had led.
3.2. The Spanish model 
The financing of Spanish public television is grounded in a very different 
tradition. Since its late beginnings in 1956, the state-owned RTVE had the monopoly 
on TV and radio broadcasting until the restoration of democracy, but at the same 
time was financed by advertising which was forbidden or very restricted on the rest 
of the continent (Baget i Herms, 1993). Liberalisation, and with it the transition 
from Paleotelevision to Neotelevision (Eco, 1986), came about in Spain in the 
1990s with the launching of Antena 3 and Telecinco, two private, non-encoded TV 
stations that began to compete directly with RTVE for a piece of the advertising 
pie. This led to the financial collapse of the public broadcasting corporation and a 
long history of accumulated debt in spite of successive injections of public funds. 
At the time, a price and audience war was unleashed, leading to what has been 
called “the leaden years of television in Spain” (Palacio, 2001, p. 171) or the 
“abominable decade” (Díaz, 2006: 343), with the inexorable expansion of junk 
TV on both private and public television channels. In spite of this deterioration 
in programming brought about by the quest for audience shares at any price, the 
accounts of RTVE are catastrophic: in 1997, the debt reached 450 billion pesetas 
or roughly 2.7 billion euros (Díaz, 2006). 
As of 2004, the socialist government of Rodríguez Zapatero introduced 
a number of significant reforms in RTVE. Apart from the purported guarantees of 
independence and impartiality of the corporation’s news programmes, reforms 
also involved a review of legal and administrative tools in order to streamline 
its management model and put an end to its long-established indebtedness by 
4 https://www.byline.com/column/51/article/950 [Accessed 11/06/16]
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]approving Framework Mandates and Programme Contracts—the new legislation 
even envisaged the dismissal of board members in the event of significant 
financial losses. The complete overhaul of the legal framework was combined 
with a radical reduction of the workforce and the conversion of the old “entity” 
into a corporation, debt-free at least for the time being. This process of renovation 
ended in 2010 with the decision to withdraw advertising, a long-standing bone of 
contention with the country’s private television companies which consequently 
would immediately increase their profits. The debate revolving around whether 
it would be convenient or not to reintroduce advertising has dragged on since 
then. The National Authority for Markets and Competition (CNMC, 2016), the 
Spanish audio-visual watchdog, has been the last to recommend its recuperation 
as a source of financing for RTVE. For the RTVE board member Miguel Ángel 
Sacaluga, the problem was not so much the loss of advertising as a source of 
income, but the 48% reduction in the state’s direct contribution to RTVE, when 
average administrative budget cuts were in the region of 20% (2016). 
The fact is that during the initial period of reforms—as of 2004—there 
was a moment of stability in which RTVE’s news programmes recuperated a 
certain of degree of credibility and the corporation once again had the highest 
viewing figures. Its prestige and audience share began to decline when the 
Partido Popular (PP) recovered power in 2011. The new government watered 
down the guarantees that ensured impartiality when appointing board members 
and directors, and the public television broadcaster’s viewing figures dropped 
below those of the private channels Antena 3 and Telecinco. In 2017, motivated 
by the political instability, the government has amended the legislation yet again, 
apparently restoring the guarantees with regard to the appointment of RTVE 
board members, but there have been no real changes to date. Since Mariano 
Rajoy became president, there have been continuous cuts in state subsidies 
(Bustamante, 2014; 2013; Soler, 2012), leading to serious financial straits and 
a debt in 2012 of €112 million, compared to €29 million in 2011.
Coinciding with the suppression of advertising on RTVE, a new 
controversial form of funding was introduced: as a contribution to public service 
broadcasting, commercial television and telecommunications operators were to 
hand over 3% and 0.9% of their annual income, respectively, to RTVE. These 
levies are reminiscent of those proposed in David Puttnam’s aforementioned 


























introduced they have been a source of continual problems, because both private 
television and telecommunications operators refuse to pay up or do so after 
a considerable delay. Even though this new source of funding was questioned 
and denounced by the European Commission, it was finally ratified in July 2013 
by the EU Court of Justice which considered that it did not breach community 
telecommunications standards5.
The climate of political instability, with the repetition of general elections 
due to a hung parliament, has meant that RTVE has been left in a kind of limbo 
for months. As already mentioned, the PP candidate (eventually invested as 
president) predicted changes in RTVE, with the idea of emulating the public 
service broadcaster par excellence: the BBC.
3.3. The complex regional autonomous system
The public radio and television ecosystem in Spain also includes 
regional autonomous broadcasters which were launched precisely during the 
same period of liberalisation that began in the 1980s and 1990s. A result of 
political decentralisation during the country’s democratic transition, there are 
currently 12 regional television corporations in the 17 autonomous communities 
making up the Spanish state—an unusual model in Europe (Bustamante, 2013; 
Richeri, 2005; Campo Vidal, 1996). All other public television corporations in 
general copy RTVE’s initial structure, including its shortcomings—i.e. a tendency 
to becoming too big, the broadcasting of commercial programmes, and the 
suspicion of institutional manipulation (Bustamante, 1999). Furthermore, 
they depend on public and private funding via advertising and state subsidies. 
On average, 25% of the financing comes from advertising and the rest from 
the regional autonomous public budget (Deloitte, 2011). Notwithstanding the 
demands of private television corporations that they should follow the example 
of RTVE by eliminating advertising, this has yet to occur.
The very autonomy of these media means that their size, budget, 
organisation etc., differ greatly. However, if there is one thing that they have in 




























































]A paradigmatic example is Radiotelevisió Valenciana (RTVV) which, together with 
the Greek television company Ellinikí Radiofonía Tileórasi (ERT), has been the 
only public broadcaster to close in Europe due to this crisis (Tambini, 2016; Des 
Freedman, 2016). Others, such as Telemadrid, recently laid off two thirds of its 
workforce, and even TV3 in Catalonia —which has always been the most highly 
regarded regional TV broadcaster— obtained its poorest audience figures ever 
in July 2016, thus losing its supremacy over the private TV channels6.
The case of RTVV is archetypical for its bad management. For example, 
its debt rose inexorably during the years of the PP autonomous government, 
reaching €39  million in 1995. Thenceforth, during the economic boom the 
broadcaster was financed largely by credits and loans which generated a long-
term debt of over €1 billion.
The turning point came in 2010, as can be seen in Graph 1, due to 
the influence of the widespread financial crisis. At that moment, it was harder 
to obtain loans and RTVV spiralled into a phase of brutal contraction that 
reduced its in-house production to a minimum. There are abundant examples 
6 http://comunicacio21.cat/noticies-comunicacio21/117838-tv3-registra-el-pitjor-resultat-d-audiencia-de-
la-seva-historia [Accessed 12/09/16]
GRAPH 1. RTVV’s Long-Term Debt in millions of euros






































of the bad use of public money during those years: one of the most outlandish 
was the purchase of the sports rights for the football clubs Valencia and 
Villareal in 2009 for €33 million. These were then sold on to third parties 
for only €22.2 million (Xambó, 2013). The arithmetic is simple: €11 million 
were lost in an operation that only served to subsidise the region’s teams, 
with no accountability in the Valencian Parliament (Col.lectiu Ricard Blasco, 
2014, pp. 76, p. 130). The broadcasting rights for the European Formula 1 
Gran Prix in Valencia, which Bernie Ecclestone pocketed, also deserve a place 
in this absurd but true story: ridiculous results in terms of audience figures 
were achieved, yet RTVV and La Sexta (a private national Spanish TV channel) 
paid €22 million plus tax for the non-exclusive rights for the 2010-13 seasons. 
In 2010 alone, over €4  million were shelled out (Sindicatura de Comptes, 
2011). All these ruinous operations make one thing clear: the Valencian 
Regional Government (Generalitat) treated RTVV like a mere dominion. Those 
responsible probably thought it did not matter who paid, whether the radio and 
television entity or the government; it was all the same.
This continual expenditure coincided with an relentless drop in viewing 
figures. RTVV had obtained 20% of the media share until 2002/2003, before 
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]There are many reasons for this loss of confidence, but one of them 
was doubtless the deterioration in the quality of the channel’s news service 
(López Olano, 2015).
After an attempt to lay off part of the workforce was rejected by the 
courts, RTVV finally folded on 29 November 2013, with the loss of 1,600 jobs. 
After a complicated and surreal legal process instigated by the PP in order to 
achieve its definitive closure (López Olano, 2016), the last elections brought 
about a change in government. Since the summer of 2015, the socialist 
president, with the backing of the nationalists and the new left-wing parties, has 
been making an effort to reopen the radio and television corporation, although 
this initiative is still in the pipeline. The provisions of the new Act 6/2016, 
passed by the Generalitat, envisage strict spending controls in order to avoid 
a repeat performance. The new legislation also establishes that it will receive 
a modest contribution from the public purse of between 0.3% and 0.6% of the 
Generalitat’s overall budget. The new corporation will only be able to resort to 
indebtedness to fund its investments and to address temporary current-account 
imbalances. In keeping with the Spanish tradition, the financing is twofold: 
the aforementioned budgetary contribution from the regional government; and 
advertising income. Although the new legislation does not dare to go further, 
in Section 1d of Article 37 it does leave the door open to imposing a levy on 
commercial and pay-per-view radio and television operators proportional to their 
profits; to broadcasting for mobile devices or by cable via phone carriers; and to 
Internet platforms and repositories. The future is thus open to other formulas.
4. Conclusions
The discussion about PSM funding is indeed essential to the model’s 
future viability. Budget sources have always varied, and still vary, greatly in the 
media systems analysed here, although digital convergence may bring them into 
line. The advantage of the Spanish system is that the state compensation for 
the public service is integrated into the general tax system, since it is a General 
State Budget allocation. In part, it is basically progressive, like Personal Income 
Tax (IRPF in Spanish). On the other hand, the British licence fee is a true flat-rate 


























afford the corporation. This is a tax that is taken very seriously in the UK: in the 
financial year 2013-2014, 32 people were jailed for not paying the licence fee. 
The issue of new means of financing associated with new forms of consumption 
is on the table in the UK and Spain alike. However, the decision to apply them 
is still pending.
Evidently, the BBC has always been an international benchmark, but 
lately even more so, at least for the Spanish PSM system troubled by political 
instability. Nonetheless, this model of independence and quality television 
is perhaps used at times as an unattainable and hackneyed example, often 
due to a profound lack of knowledge of the institution and its circumstances. 
Something that should not be overlooked is the size of the BBC’s budget 
—despite the cutbacks— which has also recently been ratified: £5  billion a 
year, £3.7 billion of which coming directly from taxes, i.e. the licence fee. RTVE 
has to make do with about €1  billion. At a local level, with the example of 
the new Corporació Valenciana de Mitjans Audiovisuals (Valencian Audiovisual 
Media Corporation), whose name has even been borrowed from its British 
counterpart, as happened with RTVE and other Spanish regional public audio-
visual companies, the phoenix of Valencia’s public service broadcaster is again 
rising from the ashes of its predecessor with an estimated yearly budget of 
between 50 to 100 million euros. The difference is so vast as to make it difficult 
to compare their respective achievements. All the same, beyond the difference 
in size of Spain’s and the UK’s media systems, financial straits have too often 
become a permanent sword of Damocles, always on the point of severing media 
independence. As Tambini has stated, it is not possible to be independent while 
waiting for cuts to be made (2016).
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